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The Docket · from the courts

When a Right Quietly Expires

Friday · July 24, 2026 · A $452 million trade-secret verdict undone because its winner sued too late, and a state oil lease that expired on its own the day a small payment went missing: two courts on the moment a legal right quietly runs out.
I · Trade secrets (DTSA)

When the Clock Starts on a Stolen Secret

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit · May 28, 2026

Two appellate courts spent the early summer on the same unglamorous problem: the moment a legal right silently expires. The Federal Circuit threw out a $452 million trade-secret verdict won by Insulet, maker of the Omnipod insulin patch, holding that its lawsuit against a South Korean rival arrived years too late under the Defend Trade Secrets Act's three-year deadline.[1] A New Mexico appeals court, meanwhile, held that a state oil-and-gas lease vanished the moment its holder missed a single small annual payment, with no notice and no chance to fix the lapse. The sharper move belongs to the Federal Circuit, which decided that the clock on a stolen secret starts not when a plaintiff can prove the theft but as soon as it knows enough to suspect one, a former employee inside a competitor plus a suspiciously similar product.[1]

The setup

Insulet makes the Omnipod, a small adhesive pump that delivers insulin without the usual tubing.[1] Several of its engineers, bound by confidentiality agreements, left to help EOFlow, a South Korean rival, develop a competing patch called the EOPatch.[1] The two firms crossed paths at a June 2018 diabetes conference, where Insulet staff saw EOFlow's second-generation device up close, and by March 2019 Insulet's own internal emails show it knew a former employee was inside EOFlow working on that product.[1] Insulet did not sue under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, the 2016 federal law that lets trade-secret owners bring theft claims in federal court, until August 2023.[2] A jury sided with Insulet and awarded $452 million, which the trial judge cut to roughly $59 million and paired with a permanent injunction.[1]

The question

The statute gives an owner three years to sue, measured from when the theft "is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered."[2] Everything turned on a single date. Counting back three years from the August 2023 complaint set the cutoff at August 2020, so the case survived only if Insulet neither knew nor should have known the facts of its claim before then.[1] The hard part was deciding how much a company must know before that clock starts, enough to prove a theft in court, or merely enough to suspect one and begin digging.[4]

The reasoning, walked

Writing for a divided panel, Judge Dyk began with the text of the deadline and one structural feature of the statute that does a great deal of work.[1] The Act says that "a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim," meaning a defendant's ongoing use of a secret is one wrong with one accrual date, not a fresh violation each day.[2] That design forecloses the escape hatch familiar from some copyright cases, where each new infringing act resets the clock.[5] Under the single-claim rule, once the period starts it runs across the whole course of conduct.

The load-bearing step was the standard the majority chose for when an owner "should have discovered" the theft.[1] The court held that a claim accrues once the owner knows two things: that the accused rival had access to its secrets through a former employee, and that there is similarity between those secrets and the rival's product.[1] Access plus similarity, in other words, is enough to start the clock. The majority brushed aside Insulet's argument that it needed the EOPatch's precise internal dimensions before it could plead a claim, reasoning that "knowledge of such nominal dimensions" is unnecessary to allege misappropriation.[6]

Applying that rule, the court laid out what Insulet knew by early 2019: former engineers inside EOFlow, a competing patch its own people called strikingly similar, and enough concern that Insulet staff had visited EOFlow's website some twenty times.[1] One internal message reported, in substance, that EOFlow had cloned the product.[4] That, the majority concluded, was more than suspicion; it was knowledge of the facts a complaint needs. Because Insulet held that knowledge well before the August 2020 cutoff, the claim was time-barred as a matter of law, and EOFlow was entitled to judgment.[1] The verdict was reversed.[3]

Judge Prost dissented, and her objection went to the heart of the majority's move.[1] A discovery rule, she argued, asks when a plaintiff actually learned or should have learned that a wrong occurred; the majority had quietly swapped in an inquiry-notice rule, which starts the clock as soon as a plaintiff has reason to investigate.[5] The practical effect, she warned, is that the deadline "starts prematurely whenever a former employee joins a competitor that makes a superficially similar product," which describes an ordinary week in a competitive industry.[1] She also faulted the majority for reweighing evidence the jury had resolved in Insulet's favor, and for deciding, without briefing, whether the deadline should be analyzed secret-by-secret rather than for the case as a whole.[5]

What turns on it

For a company that builds products in a field where engineers move between rivals, the holding rearranges the incentives around competitive intelligence.[4] A company that notices a rival hiring its people and shipping a lookalike can no longer watch quietly for years while it assembles proof, because the same watching that builds the case can also spend the time allowed to bring it.[6] The prudent response is to document suspicions early and, where the facts warrant, sue before the technical smoking gun arrives, since waiting for certainty can forfeit the claim outright.[5] The opinion is tightly reasoned on the statute's single-claim structure, and its reading of the text is defensible, yet Judge Prost's charge lands where the majority is thinnest, because the line between knowing enough to suspect and knowing enough to sue is precisely the line a discovery rule is meant to draw, and access-plus-similarity may sit closer to suspicion than the majority concedes. This is a reading of the court's reasoning, not legal advice.

II · Oil & gas leases

A Lease That Ended Itself

New Mexico Court of Appeals · June 4, 2026

The setup

On public land in southeastern New Mexico sat two gas wells that had stopped producing.[1] Their operator, Snow Oil and Gas, held a state lease first issued in 1967 and assigned to Snow in 1991, which ran for a fixed primary term and then for as long as the wells produced gas in paying quantities.[1] Because the wells were shut in, capped and idle rather than producing, the lease stayed alive only through a savings clause, a term that keeps a lease from lapsing when production stops: Snow could hold the lease by paying a small annual "shut-in" royalty, here about $261 per well, due each year on November 21.[3] Snow paid in 2015, 2016 and 2017, then missed the November 2018 payment.[1] The Commissioner of Public Lands responded in February 2019 that the lease had "automatically expired by its own terms."[1] Snow mailed two checks the next month to try to revive it, and the Commissioner refused.[1]

Snow challenged the refusal in an administrative contest and lost, then appealed to a state district court, which sided with Snow and ordered the lease reinstated, finding that the agency had not given the notice the law requires.[1] The Commissioner carried the case to the New Mexico Court of Appeals.[1]

The question

New Mexico law has a statute that shields lessees from losing a state lease abruptly.[2] Before the state may cancel a lease for a lessee's default, it must mail notice of its intent and allow thirty days to cure the problem.[2] Snow's argument was simple: it had defaulted by missing a payment, so the state owed it notice and a chance to cure before the lease could end.[1] The question was whether a missed shut-in payment triggers that cancellation machinery at all, or whether the lease instead ends on its own, in which case there is nothing to cancel and no notice to give.[1]

The reasoning, walked

The court's answer rested on a distinction that runs through oil-and-gas law between two ways a lease can end.[1] A lease can be cancelled, an affirmative act the lessor takes to end a lease still in force because the lessee broke a promise, or covenant. A lease can also terminate automatically, expiring by its own terms when a condition on its continued life goes unmet. The cancellation statute, with its notice and cure requirements, governs only the first path.[2]

Which path applied depended on how a shut-in payment functions, and here the court leaned on Greer v. Salmon, a 1971 New Mexico decision.[4] Under that case a shut-in payment is not a covenant the lessee promises to perform, but an optional condition, one of the terms that keeps the lease alive once actual production ceases.[4] That single classification decides everything that follows. Missing a shut-in payment does not breach a promise that the state must then move to enforce by cancellation; it simply fails to satisfy a condition, and the lease lapses on its own.[1] Greer had already held that the cancellation clause's notice requirements do not reach the habendum clause, the provision fixing how long a lease lasts, or its associated savings clauses.[4] Because Snow's wells were not producing and the 2018 payment never came, the lease expired at that moment, and the cancellation statute never came into play.[1]

That conclusion drove the rest.[1] Once a lease has expired by its own terms, the court held, it cannot be revived by a late payment, so Snow's March 2019 checks changed nothing.[1] The constitutional arguments failed for the same reason. A due-process claim requires a protected property interest, which New Mexico courts, borrowing a phrase that traces to the Supreme Court, define as a "legitimate claim of entitlement" rather than a mere hope of continued possession.[5] Since the lease had already dissolved, Snow held no surviving interest to protect, and no notice was constitutionally due.[1] The takings claim collapsed on the same logic, because with no property left there was nothing for the state to take.[1] The court reversed the district court and returned the case with instructions to affirm the Commissioner.[1]

What turns on it

A business that leases public land for drilling now lives under an unforgiving rule.[1] The protections that feel like a safety net, notice and a right to cure, attach to cancellation, and a self-executing expiration slips underneath them.[2] A single missed payment on an idle well, a few hundred dollars overlooked on a November deadline, can end a decades-old lease with no warning and no way back.[3] The opinion reasons cleanly from a settled distinction, and its result follows almost mechanically once the shut-in payment is classed as a condition rather than a covenant. Its vulnerability is that the entire outcome rides on that classification, which the court treats as given rather than defended at length, and a reader persuaded that a long-paid shut-in royalty had ripened into something the lessee reasonably relied on might wish the automatic-termination line had been probed harder. None of this is legal advice; it is an account of how one court moved from a single missed payment to a lease that had already ended itself.